
In January 2009, I walked through the Kigali Memorial Centre for the first time. I spent a few hours walking through each section, reading captions under solemn images and trying to imagine the horror that Read the rest of this entry »

In January 2009, I walked through the Kigali Memorial Centre for the first time. I spent a few hours walking through each section, reading captions under solemn images and trying to imagine the horror that Read the rest of this entry »
To understand how apologetic exchanges in Rwanda’s gacaca trials negotiate and situate responsibility for the 1994 Tutsi genocide, I conducted a Fantasy Theme Analysis of the kategoria (accusations) and apologia (apologetic rhetoric) in 11 gacaca trial transcripts, totaling 371 pages. In the following paragraphs, I discuss what I found—and why it matters.
Overall, I found evidence of two rhetorical visions that shed light on the symbolic realities constructed by Rwandans to explain the genocide of 1994 and who is responsible for it.
The first vision stresses the collective responsibility for the genocide and human rights violations that took place. In doing so, this vision emphasizes the responsibility of larger groups such as the government, the Interahamwe (or Hutu militia), and even the Rwanda Patriotic Front (that is, the Tutsi military group that fought the government in a civil war prior to the genocide and then swept through the country to end the atrocities). Conversely, a second rhetorical vision portrays the genocide and human rights violations as individual acts committed by specific members of the society.
In essence, the two visions represent competing visions of responsibility: one providing a macro, top-down vision of the national events and systemic roots of the genocide, while the other provides a micro, bottom-up vision of the crimes and the impact of genocide.
Two important subjects of agreement between the visions, however, are that both acknowledge the atrocities of the genocide and portray the people/groups responsible for the genocide as villains. In that sense, both visions place the horrific crimes of the 1994 genocide on the public record and rebuke those events as immoral and unjust.
These competing rhetorical visions consist of a number of distinct characteristics that shape how responsibility for the genocide are perpetuated in the gacaca courts.
I explore these aspects more in the sections below—including the characteristics, dramatis personae, plotlines, theme categories, master analogues, and values that differ between the visions. I conclude this analysis with a discussion of the broader implications of these visions.
Despite the fact that each gacaca court tries only the genocide crimes and human rights violations committed in its local community, a strong macro vision of the genocide is evident in the trial exchanges.
One of the major characteristics of this macro vision is that it focuses attention beyond the crimes committed in a particular local community and, in some cases, beyond the October 1, 1990 to December 31, 1994 timeframe that is under investigation by the gacaca system. For example, one perpetrator provided an account of his actions and the government’s actions dating back as far as 1959 and as late as 2002. In doing so, such testimonies focus attention on the systemic, historical roots of ethnic tension and crimes against humanity in Rwanda. Moreover, by extending the timeline beyond 1994, such testimonies typically include recent acts of repatriation that are in line with the values of harmony, acceptance of others, and even the defense of Rwanda against ongoing attacks by génocidaires outside Rwanda’s borders (for example, attacks by groups coming into Rwanda from the Congo). While this vision is not constructed exclusively by perpetrators on trial, the evidence suggests that the macro, top-down view is more commonly perpetuated by those individuals.
The micro vision of the genocide differs from the macro vision in its emphasis on local crimes, perpetrators, victims, and implications of the genocide. For example, one witness testified against a perpetrator who was on trial, saying: “This very man ordered that the people be gathered in sectors and cells be taken away to be killed” (emphasis added). In another example, after a perpetrator testified that he was part of a group that hit an old man with a club and “left him there,” a member of the audience interrupted and stated “You ought to say ‘We killed him’” (emphasis added). Two gacaca judges then challenged the perpetrator—one asked “You killed him?” followed by another asking “Or you left him alive?” The perpetrator answered by saying “I couldn’t have that feeling or sense to check whether that person is dead or not. They hit him with clubs, we thought that he was dead.” These exchanges demonstrate the micro vision’s focus on specific details regarding specific actions, victims, and perpetrators. This is in stark contrast to the generalities of the macro vision, which focus on vaguely defined perpetrators and actions.
Another characteristic that sets the macro vision apart from the micro are the differing dramatis personae in the two visions. The term dramatis personae refers to the heroic and villainous “characters that are given life within the drama (vision)” (Shields & Preston, 1985, p. 106). The term dramatis personae is used instead of characters to distinguish the qualities that are attributed to a character in the vision from the actual “qualities that may or may not be possessed” by a real person (Shields & Preston, 1985, p. 107).
I stated above that both visions focus on villains; however, I should point out that the villains in the macro vision consist of large groups that influenced national events—such as the Hutu-led government for instigating and sanctioning human rights violations of Tutsi dating back to the 1950s, the Interahamwe (or Hutu militia) for planning and conducting the genocide throughout the country, the Rwanda Patriotic Front for heightening tensions between Hutus and Tutsis by launching a civil war against the Hutu-led government prior to the genocide, vague villains such as the “enemies who shot down Habyarimana’s plane,” and even the foreign countries that refused to stop the genocide.
Three points are important in analyzing the dramatis personae of the macro vision:
First, they consist of large, abstract groups. In other words, they are recognizable names of groups, but they are vague or even unidentifiable in terms of individuals. For example, which members of the Hutu-led government instigated the attacks on Hutus? Who was a member of the Interahamwe? Who were the “enemies who shot down Habyarimana’s plane”? (To date, no conclusive evidence has been found to identify either the individuals or group that committed the act.)
The second important point is that by emphasizing the villainous roles of large, nationally influential groups, the macro vision constructs a reality in which leaders and planners of the genocide bear the major responsibility for the atrocity. The result of this emphasis is that it not only acknowledges the human right violations, but also the intentional design as well as the preventability of the genocide. As one perpetrator explicitly stated: “The genocide of the Tutsi was planned and executed…by the government of Rwanda” followed a few minutes later by “Yes, the genocide took place, but neither the UN nor foreign countries took appropriate measures to punish the perpetrators at that time.”
This leads to the third important point regarding the dramatis personae in the macro vision. By situating responsibility on the national leaders and planners as well as foreign countries, macroists construct the actual perpetrators as victims caught up in a national atrocity they could not control, as victims of false accusations in gacaca trials, and sometimes even as heroes. One accused perpetrator summed up the dramatis personae of victim and hero in his testimony by stating: “I did my best in a bad situation” followed later by “No single individual was attacked… under my command in the cathedral.”
The micro vision also emphasizes villainous personae; however, the villains in this vision are the specific individuals who performed genocide crimes and human rights violations. For example, one perpetrator accepted responsibility for a series of brutal attacks by stating “I participated in those crowd attacks.” He went on to name four other individuals—including their first and last names, the communities they are from, the specific roles they played in the attacks, the weapons used, and where the bodies of the victims were left. This testimony demonstrates the micro vision’s emphasis on individual community members as villains who conducted brutal attacks during the genocide. Interestingly, the micro vision does not include any heroes; the only other dramatis personae in this vision are the sub-characters of victims (community members who were killed during the genocide) and survivors (community members who were attacked or threatened but some how escaped death). These sub-characters are almost always positioned as passive participants—meaning they do not take active steps to influence the events, but are instead acted upon by the villains.
The plotline “provides the action of a rhetorical vision” (Cragan & Shields, 1992, p. 201) or, in simpler terms, describes “who is doing what, to whom, and how” in the vision (Shields & Preston, 1985, p. 107). Here again, the two visions differ dramatically. The macro vision’s plotline focuses on large nationally influential groups who manipulate and lead average citizens to violence against each other for ideological reasons using indirect means such as laws, military orders, combat training, and fear. This plotline can be described as collective and conspiratorial. The micro vision’s plotline, on the other hand, focuses on specific individuals of a community who attack and kill other members of that community for personal vengeance or hatred using hand-to-hand weapons such as clubs, machetes, and spears. This plotline is individual and vindictive.
Another area of divergence between the two visions is the type of theme evident in each. As I mentioned above, the themes in rhetorical visions can take three forms: (1) script themes that focus on the actions of the characters, (2) scenic themes that focus on the stage or setting in which the action occurred, or (3) actor themes that focus on the characters who perform the actions (Duffy, 1997). As I noted, the macro vision emphasized the actions of large nationally influential groups and the long history of hate, fear, and suspicion in Rwanda. As such, the macro vision puts forth a scenic theme that emphasizes the context and backdrop in which the genocide took place. In doing so, this theme minimizes the specific actors or acts of human rights violations that occurred. The micro vision, however, directs attention away from the historical context and instead puts forth a script theme that details the specific actions of genocide, including acts committed in attacks, what weapons were used, and what impact these crimes had on the people and community.
Rhetorical visions can be categorized in one of three competing master analogues that reflect the structure of reality (Cragan & Shields, 1992). The pragmatic master analogue values expediency, utility, and efficiency. A rhetorical vision based on a social master analogue focuses on trust, caring, and human relationships. Finally, the righteous master analogue differentiates between right and wrong, moral and immoral, just and unjust. Interestingly, both the macro and the micro visions are based on a righteous master analogue. They differ, however, in what they judge to be wrong or unjust. The macro vision’s righteous master analogue casts judgment on national leaders and ideological groups throughout the history of Rwanda (such as the Hutu-led government, the Interahamwe, and the Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front) who instituted unjust policies or engaged in immoral wars that ultimately led to the genocide. In addition, macroists position inactivity by the United Nations and nations such as the United States as immoral. Like the macro vision, the micro vision reflects a righteous master analogue. Its righteousness, however, denounces the immoral acts of murder and violence committed during the genocide as well as the denial or partial denial of those acts in gacaca trial testimony.
In the end, both rhetorical visions demonstrate basic convictions that are reflected in their rhetorical constructions of the 1994 genocide. The macro, top-down vision values complexity, history, and hierarchical responsibility. While the micro vision also values responsibility, it emphasizes individual responsibility. Additionally, it values specificity over complexity.
Using Fantasy Theme Analysis, I have uncovered two rhetorical visions that reflect the symbolic realities of Rwandans regarding the 1994 genocide. As Bormann (1972) stated, rhetorical visions function as a lens through which members of the group view their world. But in the case of the gacaca trials, these visions do much more.
The accusations and apologies in gacaca trials are witnessed by judges, families of the victims and the broader community. They’re also recorded on film, trial transcripts, and an official Gacaca Jurisdiction document entitled “Record of Confession, Guilty Plea, Repentance and Apology.” In that sense, the dramatis personae, plotlines, theme categories, master analogues, and values of these competing rhetorical visions put the events of the 1994 genocide on the public record.
Two points of agreement that the rhetorical visions place on that public record are important to reiterate. First, both visions acknowledge that the genocide occurred. The macro vision acknowledges that the genocide was planned and carried out nationwide, while the micro vision records the individual brutal atrocities that took place in each community or village. In doing so, they place these aspects on the public record, making denial by opposing or future groups that much harder. Second, both visions value responsibility for the genocide. The macro vision places that responsibility on the national leaders and influential organizations, while the micro vision places responsibility for the genocide on the specific individuals who committed the atrocities in communities and villages throughout the country.
These aspects shape how the community—and ultimately the country—remembers the genocide, how responsibility is situated, and what the members of post-genocide Rwanda value as they move beyond the terrible events of 1994.
In other words, the rhetorical visions discussed above are not only symbolic constructions of reality, but they are also the basis for the collective memory of post-genocide Rwanda.
In areas torn apart by genocide and human rights violations, collective memory “invokes shared emotions and consciousness” that become important parts of the “healing, reconciliation, and reconstruction” (Chirwa, 2000, p. 111). An important element of collective memory, however, is collective forgetting. As Paul Connerton (1989) stated, “It is not because thoughts are similar that we evoke them; it is rather because the same group is interested in those memories, and is able to evoke them, that they are assembled together in our minds” (p. 37). This raises the question of “how collective are ‘collective memories’? Whose memories are they?” (Chirwa, 2000, p. 111).
Gacaca courts are only mandated to address crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity that occurred between October 1990 and December 1994, which is the time period immediately preceding and during the 1994 genocide. Moreover, gacaca courts do not address war crimes committed by the Rwanda Patriotic Front against Hutus during the civil war leading up to—or in the fighting to end—the genocide. In other words, by mandate, the testimonies and documents of the gacaca system provide a narrow view of history that “fail[s] to take into account the long history of human rights abuses in Rwanda in which both Hutus and Tutsis have been perpetrators and victims” (Sarkin, 2001, p. 161).
The result of this narrow view is that the accusations and apologies, as well as the rhetorical visions constructed in those exchanges, are equally narrowed. That is, crimes committed by the Tutsi government long before the Hutu government gained control—as well as opinions that the attacks against Tutsis were one part of a larger civil war—are not even included in these exchanges. The entire discourse is shaped by legal mandate, documentation, and cultural expectations to only include apologetic exchanges that acknowledge wrongdoing (and, as a result, place genocide on the public record) and provide the details of crimes committed during a specific time period (which, as a result, shapes the rhetorical visions and collective memory of that public record since the time period only includes crimes committed by a specific group).
This narrow focus may help explain why both the rhetorical visions identified in the apologetic exchanges explicitly acknowledge the genocide and value responsibility for the genocide—rather than refute the term “genocide” or deny that any one group or person should be held responsible.
Finally, the rhetorical visions above have implications on post-genocide Rwanda that go beyond placing the 1994 genocide on the public record and shaping the collective memory of Rwandans. That’s because, in constructing a rhetorical vision, members of a community essentially “build a shared identity” that differentiates them from outside groups and creates “a shared understanding of the group and what it means to be a member” (Duffy, 2003, p. 293). As Bormann (1985) explained,
People create a common consciousness by becoming aware that they are involved in an identifiable group and that their group differs in some important respects from other groups…. Once the sharing of fantasies identifies the group and distinguishes between insiders and outsiders, the members have clear rhetorical and symbolic boundaries to serve as guidelines…to force members out. (pp. 11-12)
In other words, the rhetorical visions described above partially determine the identity of post-genocide Rwanda. As a result, a person’s standing as a valued member of society hinges, in part, on whether that person subscribes to the rhetorical visions reflecting acknowledgment of and responsibility for the 1994 genocide.
In my dissertation, I argue that contextual factors such as politics, cultural expectations and documentation shape the apologetic exchanges—which can in turn shape reconciliation, identity, and membership in communities once torn apart by hatred, genocide, and human rights violations. In this post, I look specifically at how apologies are documented in gacaca trials as well as what influences that documentation may have on society in post-genocide Rwanda.
DOCUMENTATION IN THE GACACA COURT SYSTEM
The gacaca system is divided into two phases of documentation. The first phase—or fact-finding phase—comprised identifying and documenting a list of all the crimes that were believed to have taken place leading up to and during the genocide. This phase included identifying and documenting suspects and witnesses, offenses, and names of victims, as well as determining the appropriate category of each offense (Tiemessen, 2004, p. 61). The second phase consisted of trying the cases against the accused perpetrators and documenting findings of each trial (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, 2004a, p. 6).
In other words, documentation is a major component of both phases—and, therefore, of each trial’s setting. Documentation is so crucial to the gacaca system that the Rwandan government produced an official training and reference manual for gacaca judges entitled Process of Collecting Information Required in Gacaca Courts. The manual provided detailed instructions regarding what information was to be documented, how it was to be gathered, and the procedures for filling out and filing 33 different gacaca trial documents—including documents such as “Death of Each Victim of Genocide,” “Distribution of Killing Weapons in the Cell,” “Road Blocks Erected in the Cell,” “Identity and Charges Against the Accused,” and “Notification of Verdict” (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, 2004b).
DOCUMENTING APOLOGETIC RHETORIC IN GACACA TRIALS
In terms of apologetic rhetoric, the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (2004b) stated that understanding how the genocide was perpetuated and its effects requires “that whoever participated in genocide takes the initiative to confess, plead guilty, repent and apologise” (p. 5). These apologies are witnessed by judges, survivors, and entire communities, and they are recorded on an official government document entitled “Record of Confession, Guilty Plea, Repentance and Apology.” This document includes sections for recording the identity of the accused, the crimes that person confessed to (including the exact nature, weapons used, time and place of the crime), the names of the victims as well as the names of any accomplices and witnesses. In addition, ample space is provided at the end of the document for a detailed handwritten narrative explaining how each crime was committed, as well as for two apologies to be written (one to “God the Almighty, The State of Rwanda and Rwandans” and the other to “Families of the victims”). Finally, the last section on that document includes space for a written description explaining how the perpetrator is prepared “to face and live with the survivors of the victims’ families” (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, 2004b, p. viii).
CULTURAL EXPECTATIONS AND DOCUMENTATION
In analyzing the information recorded in the “Record of Confession, Guilty Plea, Repentance and Apology” document, I argue that gacaca trials are shaped by the search for and documentation of apologetic elements that Rwandans value. My field research in Rwanda in January 2009 resulted in the identification of four common characteristics of a successful apology: a detailed narrative of the crime or offense, a statement of sorrow combined with a request for forgiveness, the demonstration of sincerity and heart-felt remorse, and reparations (either symbolic or real). Three of these elements are evident in the official gacaca trial documentation of apologies.
In the “Record of Confession, Guilty Plea, Repentance and Apology” a detailed narrative of the crime is documented in Sections II, III, and IV of the document. Specifically, Section II provides a list of information for judges to collect regarding each perpetrator—including individual crimes and information regarding the time, place, and weapons used in each crime.
Section III also provides a list of information to be recorded by judges; however, this information focuses on documenting the human toll of the perpetrator’s actions, including the names of each victim (and any known nicknames), the names of their parents, and where each person’s body was placed after death.
Section VI moves from quantified or objective data to a first-person narrative of the crime. In addition, rather than being completed by a judge, this section is designed to be handwritten by the perpetrator (or, in cases where the perpetrator is illiterate, to be written by the judge using the words of the perpetrator). According to the document, this written narrative should explain the “details of how each crime was committed” (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, 2004b, p. viii).
Additionally, the statement of sorrow and request for forgiveness that Rwandans value are documented in the two sections designated for the two written apologies. The document also provides space for the perpetrator to record a “general” apology to “God the Almighty, The State of Rwanda and Rwandans” in Section VII and a “particular” apology directed to “Families of the victims” in Section VIII (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, 2004b, p. viii). Finally, the Rwandan need for symbolic or real reparations is documented in Section IX. Once again, this section provides space for the perpetrator’s written explanation of how he or she is prepared to face and live with the victims’ families.
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PLACING GENOCIDE ON THE PUBLIC RECORD
This information is gathered through ongoing dialogue (i.e., accusations and apologies) and is then recorded by the judges on the document. These documents are sent to the main office of the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions in Kigali and are intended to be made publicly available both at the official Documentation Centre in Kigali and (in the future) online through a database website of featuring scanned images of these official documents. In that sense, these documents form a large part of the public record of the 1994 genocide not only in Rwanda but also around the world as researchers begin to gain access to and report on the findings in these documents.
SHAPING POST-GENOCIDE SOCIETY
While some people may be tempted to view such documents as merely recording and relaying information, it’s important to remember that documentation is in fact much more “complex, active, and creative” and “involves giving shape to information…for the practical interests and needs of specific audiences” (Dombrowski (2000, p. 3). One of the active ways in which documents give shape to information is focusing on the information that is valued or needed by a specific audience. For example, in the case of the documents and reports of the tobacco industry in the 1960s and 1970s, the tobacco industry’s “values strongly guided what technical information was reported and how it was presented” (Dombrowski, 2000, p. 170).
The point I am getting at is that “documents both reflect and structure activity at all phases of the process” (Sauer, 2003, p. 331; emphasis added). That is, the evidence that a group deems valuable, shapes not only what is documented but the entire process by which it is documented—including which individuals give testimony; what questions are asked; and how that knowledge is quantified, measured, and ultimately recorded in official documents. Moreover, since the documents provide answers and insight by which a group comes to understand a problem or event, we can say that social values shape the process of data collection and the documents, which in turn “shape our understanding of the worlds we seek to understand” (Sauer, 2003, p. 331).
The presence of these elements in the “Record of Confession, Guilty Plea, Repentance and Apology” has two significant impacts on the documentation setting. First, it demonstrates how Rwandan culture and values shape not only what is documented but the entire process by which it is documented—including which individuals give testimony; what questions are asked; and how that knowledge is quantified, measured, and recorded. In other words, the presence of these elements in the official document shapes the apologetic exchanges that take place by narrowing the attention of judges and requiring perpetrators to offer specific information in order to fulfill the requirements of the document. Second, since this is the official document by which perpetrators place their admittance of guilt and repentance on the public record, the presence of these elements shapes more than just what is documented but also how the events of the 1994 genocide are discussed and remembered in the official government history.
FUTURE RESEARCH
These influences on the apologetic rhetoric and the entire process of gacaca trials are new elements in the analysis not only of apologetic rhetoric but also of reconciliation. Future studies on these elements in Rwanda as well as the impact of documentation in other areas recovering from genocide or human rights violations are warranted.
As part of any analysis of apologetic rhetoric, I argue that we must first consider how the cultural context influences and shapes accusations and apologies. Although I don’t have the room in this post for an in-depth discussion of Rwandan culture, I would like to offer a very brief discussion of what Rwandans expect from apologies and how that impacts not only the rhetoric in gacaca trials, but also how we go about analyzing those exchanges.
In January 2009, I conducted field research in Kigali, Rwanda to help uncover how and why Rwandans apologize. Based on the interview and focus group discussions as well as the answers participants gave to the role-play interview questions, four common characteristics of a successful apology became evident: (1) a detailed narrative of the crime or offense, (2) a statement of sorrow combined with a request for forgiveness, (3) the demonstration of sincerity and heart-felt remorse, and (4) reparations (either symbolic or real).
One of the most distinct elements of Rwandan apologetic rhetoric is the importance of a detailed narrative of the offense or crime. According to the participants’ comments, rather than simply stating that an act was wrong, the apologist must explain in detail what happened, when it happened, and why it happened.
In addition to a detailed narrative of the wrongful act, the interview and focus group research uncovered a strong reliance on third-party participation. This aspect of third-party participation echoes, to some extent, Howard-Hassmann and Lombardo’s (2008) finding that apologies are often delivered publicly in African societies to acknowledge the crime or offense and to set the public record straight. For example, one participant who was quoted by Howard-Hassmann and Lombardo (2008) stated that “if there were witnesses to his misdeed, he might apologize in front of them, in front of village elders, or in front of the entire community” (p. 222).
These cultural expectations shape the setting and apologetic rhetoric of gacaca trials. In addition, these elements are evident in the structure of gacaca trials as well as the documentation. For instance, the gacaca trials are designed for community members to come forward and participate as witnesses, victims, and judges who not only attend and listen but actively participate and shape the narrative and, ultimately, the apology that the perpetrator delivers. Additionally, as I discuss below, a detailed narrative of each crime is recorded in official court documents in the form of a lengthy written explanation of the “details of how each crime was committed.”
In that sense, one should not analyze the apologetic rhetoric or the documents of gacaca trials without also considering the cultural setting and expectations from which they are derived.
In a previous post, I described why scholars of apologetic rhetoric should study Rwanda and the apologetic exchanges in the gacaca trials. It occurs to me, however, that many people are not familiar with these trials or why they’re important. So in this post, I provide a brief overview of the system and what it aims to achieve.
In 1996, the Rwandan government first established Rwandan courts to “try genocide crimes and massacres or crimes against humanity, committed from October 1, 1990” under Organic Law No. 08/96 (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, 2004, p. 4). However, due to the overwhelming number of genocide-related cases awaiting trial, the Rwandan government later enacted Organic Law No. 40/2000 in January 2001. This new law formed the gacaca trial system and described in detail the “organization and prosecution of offences constituting the crime of genocide and massacres or other crimes against humanity, committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994” through the Gacaca Jurisdiction (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, 2004, p. 5).
The gacaca system that was instituted was based on a traditional model for resolving disputes in Rwanda. Loosely translated as “judgment of the grass,” gacaca trials in pre-colonial times consisted of community members arguing their disputes over land, cattle, marriage, loans, and property to a panel of judges made up of community elders (Tiemessen, p. 61). In essence, these traditional courts used arbitration to achieve “a settlement that was accepted by both parties to the dispute” as well as to restore “tranquility within the community” (Le Mon, 2007, p. 16).
Although today’s gacaca system is founded on the historical ideals of the traditional courts, its mandate and legitimacy is drastically different. To begin with, the newly formed gacaca system includes community members as judges and witnesses, but it is sanctioned and legally mandated by the national government. Participation is not voluntary nor is it as informal as it was the pre-colonial system. Instead, the Gacaca Jurisdiction that oversees the system has stated that it is the duty of every Rwandan to participate in the trials of their community (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, 2004). In fact, the organic law creating the gacaca system includes provisions to prosecute any individuals who refuse to participate or give testimony (Ngesi & Villa-Vicencio, 2003).
According to the system today, criminals involved in genocide-related violence and destruction of property can receive the alternative punishment of community service rather than an extended prison sentence if they offer a truthful confession of their criminal actions, followed by repentance and an apology (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, n.d.). In that sense, the modern gacaca system mirrors its pre-colonial predecessor’s emphasis on apologies as integral to the reconciliation process (Rwembeho, n.d.).
In short, the the Gacaca Jurisdictions—which oversee the gacaca trials—have five main goals: (1) to “reveal the truth on the genocide events,” (2) to try the overwhelming number genocide crimes more quickly, (3) to “eradicate the culture of impunity,” (4) to help reconcile Rwandans and strengthen the unity of communities, and (5) to demonstrate that Rwanda is capable of solving its own problems without outside intervention or direction (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, 2004, p. 5).
To accomplish those goals, the process was divided into two phases. The first phase involved the collection of information about the genocide (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, 2004, p. 5). Essentially, this phase consisted of fact-finding projects throughout the country to document all of the crimes that were believed to have taken place leading up to and during the genocide—including identifying suspects and witnesses, recording the offenses and names of victims, and determining the appropriate category of each offense (Tiemessen, 2004, p. 61). The second phase of the Gacaca Jurisdictions’ activities consisted of trying the cases against the accused perpetrators (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, 2004, p. 6).
Recently, I’ve had some people ask me why I’m studying apologetic rhetoric in Rwanda when there are so many examples of apologies in the news every day that are closer to home. In the following paragraphs, I try to describe not only why I’m studying apologies in Rwanda’s gacaca trials, but also why scholars in general should study Rwandan apologetic rhetoric.
Why Rwanda?
For scholars of apologia and apologies, Rwanda offers one of the most unique and important case studies for understanding Read the rest of this entry »